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The Burma War

Page history last edited by PBworks 16 years, 3 months ago


 

The Burma War
**Dates: 2100-2125
ACTORS: Vietnamese forces and other SSA Allies versus Burmese rebels
RESULTS: Independence for parts of Burma and neighboring China, absorbtion of Rangoon Province into Vietnam
Start of varying levels of animosity between India and Sunshine Alliance nations Buddhist Theocracy seated in Lhasha

 

Introduction

 

The Burma War was a conflict begun in the late 21st Century after the Burmese government collasped, forcing a Vietnamese intervention.

 

 

Combatants: Vietnamese government forces, assorted allies, rebels

Outcome: Independence for parts of Burma, absorbtion of Rangoon Province into Vietnam, and several decades of varying levels of animosity between Sunshine Alliance nations and India.

 

Since the questions have been asked, let's have a short look at just how Burma came to be in its awful predicament.
 
1)  What happened to Burma's legitimate elected government?
 
Well, they were elected, in 1990, but the ruling faction refused to hand over power.  Since then its been one gang of oligarchs after another, Banana Republic style.
 
2)  So they didn't have a legitimate government when the Vietnamese moved in?
 
Whoa, easy there on the word "legitimate".  Since when did "legitimate" mean "elected"?  Most of the world considered Saddam "legitimate" in 2002.  Let's settle on "in control, more or less" and leave "legitimate" to idealogues.
 
3)  But the people of Burma...
 
Consisted of people with guns who liked the current government, the people with guns who didn't, and the rest who just tried to stay out of the way and hope things got better.  The last group was most likely the largest.
 
4)  The people with guns against the government:  freedom fighters or terrorists?
 
One of the distinctions is that freedom fighters have some sort of agenda that they are fighting for that in some sense actually includes freedom, in the "if we win there will be freedom" mode and not merely the "if we win we will be in charge" mode.  Burma has never had many freedom fighters.  A lot of people hoping to be in charge, though.
 
5)  But wait, we haven't been clear on who the people were supporting!
 
That's true.  But then, who ever really asked them?  People never answer that question honestly until they are absolutely certain that an honest answer will not result in punishment.  Perhaps one day if the people of Burma ever get a "purple finger day" they will answer that question.
 
6) So why did the government fall?
 
Math.  Quality of Life calculation.  Specifically, QOL for ex-ministers in beach resort in Dhubai,living incognito off carefully hidden assets > QOL of ministers being gunned down on streets of Rangoon by anti-government..umm... armed elements.  The senior ministers packed bags, shopped for new sunglasses and beach apparel,  and fled.  Morale of armed forces and junior government officials (ie, the people who actually make things work) approaches zero when that happens.  They quite en masse.  

 

 

The Burma War, thru 2109

 

By 2108 the heavy Vietnamese presence in Burma caused the various feuding groups to stabilize into pro- and anti-Vietnamese factions. The pro-Vietnamese Burmese were attracted to the huge investments and aid programs the Vietnamese were channeling from their East Asia allies. The anti-Vietnamese factions, though able to sustain themselves and acquire arms through illicit channels, did not have nearly so much to offer.

 

Despite financial aid, the other nations of East Asia avoided actual military commitment. An exception was the South East Asian Alliance (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and the Phillipines). Although they kept their troops out, their naval forces provided support to the Vietnamese, and they provided assistance with logistics and intelligence “off screen”, with significant amounts of SEAA munitions being used by Vietnamese forces. The SEAA and other allies did provide economic assistance and development advisors on the ground, however.

 

The centerpiece of the PRV's efforts to stabilize the former Burmese regions and neutralize the insurgency there has been economic. This economic policy could best be summed upwith the popular slogan "You are better off now than you were five years ago", which appeared on banners and murals across Burma.

 

The Vientnamese concentrated not on military victory over the opposition, but on establishing investment, economic development, and health/educational improvement, along with personal freedoms, rule of law, and personal opportunity. All this occurred during a period of substantial reduction in the Vietnamese armed forces.

 

The Vietnamese and their allies have made an effort to conceptually divide the region of northern Burma- now generally referred to as the “Irawaddy Basin” from southern Burma. This is apparently designed to appeal to the ethnic groups of the region who are not thrilled over close association with Burma. Where they could, the Vietnamese and their alleis attempted to build local autonomous structures for the non-ethnically Burman minorities like the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, and the Mon.

 

At the same time, economic development in southern Burma focused on the city of Rangoon and it’s surroundings, with the Vietnamese emphasizing Rangoon's cosmopolitan and commercial identity –working with local business and entrepreneurial elites to promote to investment, job creation, and higher wages, and increased access to global markets … and building relations with Vietnamese business enterprises.

 

The forces actually committed to fighting were light. Territorial light and heavy forces secured the Rangoon region, leaving a Mobile Light Force for operations in the north. Air and naval forces were available.

 

Despite heated rhetoric, India remained quiet. Their forces secured their side of the frontier, but Indian troops did not enter Burma. Indian intelligence services have been strongly focussed on the area, however.

 

By the close of 2109, the Rangoon region has seen the end of fighting, beyond the occasional guerilla attack. The area is integrating itself into the Vietnamese economy, and the standard living is recovering.

 

The northern situation has not stabilized. Vietnamese air supremacy can protect Vietnamese forces under attack, and prevent any critical massing of the guerillas, but they have too few troops to control the extremely rugged jungle countryside, especially along the mountainous border with India. The Vietnamese generals in the field have asked for at least 3 more light or garrison forces to do the job. In 2108, and again in 2109, there are large scale guerilla offensives, in the north, aimed at taking Mandalay. Although the Vietnamese garrison there is cut off for weeks at a time, neither guerilla offensive succeeds.

 

Some Burmese, on both sides, have suggested separation, viewing the fragmentation of Burma as preferable to indefinite continued fighting. This is idea is very far from popular, so far.

 

Toward 2110, China invested heavily in the northern parts of Burma. In the area of Northern Burma, the Irawaddy Basin, Chinese humanitarian and intelligence agencies fanned out through the rural areas, bringing much needed relief.  This has a lot to do with the recent calming of the situation.  Rural warlords have plenty of black market weapons, but realize that using them will cut the flow of Chinese support to their areas.  Insurgents who were confident about attacking the Burmese government, then the Vietnamese, are not so certain about angering China. Also in 2110, Burmese Civil leadership began to press the central Vietnamese government for a plebiscite.

 

 

2110-2120

 

As the Burma War wound down, a series of controversies between Sunshine Alliance Allies and India developed. Points of contention were the delay in holding elections within Burma to decide its ultimate fate. It was revealed during the decade that India funded the Burmese rebels, sparking decades of animosity, trade sanctions, and rhetoric.

 

 

END OF THE WAR-after 2125

 

Burma as it was is no more.      It was always a weak nation, for its entire history, held together only by force.  The ethnic groups of the northern areas have never been treated as equals by the ethnic groups of the southern areas.  When it came down to the ballot box, the people of north Burma decided it was time to part company.  They want no part of the government of the south.

 

There are many Burmese (the people of the south are ethnic Burmese) who think that the Vietnamese engineered the split, by focusing on the independent identity of the region.  The Vietnamese went as far as popularizing the name "Irawadi Basin" to draw attention away from the region's history as part of Burma.  The idea of northern Burma didn't sit well with many.  The Burmese almost, almost, mounted a serious offensive to try and regain control of the region, anticipating that Vietnam would help them.

 

But the Vietnamese government, frayed and strained by the long years of the insurgency and even more so by the growing frustration with an obsolete political party that still framed all debate in terms of a war over a century ago, chose that moment to turn on itself.    "The Revolt of the Technocrats" swept Hanoi, as government institutions chose to obey their own ministers instead of the increasingly irrelevant party bosses.  Bitter political feuding engulfed Vietnam, making them deaf to the pleas of the Rangoon government. 

 

Rangoon's attempt to take control of the Irawadi Basin, for the final time.  With all the cards finally on the table, it became clear that in years past, India had supplied weapons to groups in the Irawadi Basin.  When the battle was with the Vietnamese, with modern firepower backed by their East Asian allies, and East Asian investment money, these weapons were largely unused.  No use fighting when the foreign aid money was pouring in.  But with the Vietnamese caught up in their own turmoil, these weapons came out of hiding, and were more than enough to convince Rangoon that subjugating the north was impossible. All hope of a re-unified Burma was destroyed on the Road to Mandalay.

 

The Burmese, exhausted and with no hope of winning without Vietnam's direct aid, gave up, and agreed to the terms of the north.  But the fate of northern Bur---excuse me, Irawadi Basin, that is the surprise, and will follow the news from China.  Let's say, every now and then, history has unexpected political twists.  Let us return to Rangoon.

 

Rangoon saw opportunity in the fundamental shift in the Vietnamese government.  They saw two sides feuding for control, and understood that if they found the right horse, and backed it, they could claim some spoils from the victory.  Embarrassed by the failure to hold onto the Irawadi Basin, Rangoon desired a close, permanent relationship with Vietnam- for protection, if nothing else.  In a world where powers looked for trivial excuses to plan invasions, the turmoil in Burma, far worse than Somalia in its most dreadful moments, was an invitation.  Rangoon needed strength in its corner to guarantee its sovereignty.  It needed East Asian strength.  When the dust at last settled, a new government, a Technocracy, was running Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Rangoon.

 

Now the Vietnamese are ecstatic over the end of the Burmese war. (and this is about the only source of "public good will" the new government has, so far)  Sure, things are messy now, but with the guns finally silent, and no more single party system with its seriously retro political banners “All Joy is Found in the Quiet and Busy Factory, they could  well anything.

 

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